Cyber Security
Cloud security expressed as code in the path to production: landing zones that start compliant, posture management that keeps them there, workload protection at runtime, and an explicit, per-service split of what the provider secures and what you must.
What we deliver
Every engagement is scoped to your environment - deploy a single capability or the full stack.
An explicit, per-service line between provider-managed and customer-managed controls, written down and owned.
A foundation that is compliant on day one instead of remediated in year two.
Continuous detection and correction of the misconfiguration class that causes most cloud incidents.
One correlated view from code to running workload, with attack paths ranked instead of findings counted.
Control over the estate IT never provisioned and finance keeps renewing.
The same guardrails whichever provider the team builds on, enforced before deployment.
Residency, encryption and key custody arranged so the answer is defensible in every market you serve.
Move workloads without carrying old weaknesses into a larger blast radius.
Be able to investigate in an environment where the evidence evaporates by design.
Prove that cloud workloads can be recovered, not merely that they are backed up.
Technical deep dive
Applies to any multi-account, multi-team cloud estate where infrastructure is created by pipelines faster than a posture tool can raise tickets about it.
What this is
Preventive cloud security. The same control library is expressed as policy-as-code and evaluated at three points: in the pull request, at admission to the cloud control plane, and continuously against running state. Detected drift is corrected by a pull request against the module that generated it, not by a click in a console.
The problem being solved
Three cloud providers across dozens of accounts, created by acquisition, by corporate standard and by a team with a departmental card. Posture management is deployed and raises several thousand findings a week. They are triaged by a small central team, fixed in the console, and reappear on the next deployment because the module that generated them was never changed. An audit asks for a list of internet-reachable storage holding regulated data; the answer takes nine days and is contested. Meanwhile developers experience security as a queue that blocks them after the fact, so they route around it.
Why it is hard
Reference architecture - step through it
# ─ control library entry (provider-neutral, compiled outward) ─────────────
control: CLD-DATA-003
intent: >
Data services must not be reachable from the public internet unless an
active, expiring exception exists, and must encrypt with customer-managed
keys.
applies_to: [object_storage, managed_database, message_queue, search]
severity: critical
assert:
- public_network_access == false
- encryption.key_type == "customer_managed"
- logging.data_plane == true
- tags.owner is defined and tags.data_class is defined
exception:
allowed: true
requires: [named_owner, compensating_control, expiry <= 90d]
grants: this_resource_only # never a wildcard
# ─ pre-merge: the engineer sees this in the pull request ──────────────────
✗ CLD-DATA-003 storage/analytics-export (module: modules/bucket v2.1.0)
public_network_access = true expected false
encryption.key_type = "provider" expected "customer_managed"
apply this change:
- public_access = true
+ public_access = false
+ kms_key_id = module.keys.analytics.id
or request an exception: gg exception request CLD-DATA-003 --resource …
evaluated in 14s · 3 other resources in this plan passed
# ─ admission: the same control, enforced provider-side ───────────────────
provider_a: SCP Deny s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock where value != true
provider_b: Azure Policy deny publicNetworkAccess != 'Disabled'
provider_c: Org Policy constraints/storage.publicAccessPrevention = enforced
# ─ drift: correction lands as a pull request, not a console click ────────
drift detected storage/legacy-reports public_network_access → true
changed_by console session, identity ops-admin-3, 04:12Z
root cause resource not managed by a module (imported 2024)
action PR #4471 opened → import into modules/bucket v2.1.0
interim admission policy already blocking new reads externallyMeasured change
| Measure | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Misconfigurations reaching production | ~3,400 findings/week | under 40/week, all exception-tracked |
| Mean exposure window for a public data service | hours to days | prevented at admission |
| Remediation that persists | console fixes, recurring | PR against the generating module |
| Time to answer a cross-cloud audit query | 9 days, contested | seconds, with a timestamp |
| Developer feedback latency | days, via ticket | 14 seconds, in the pull request |
Security moved from the end of the process to inside it. The finding count fell not because the tooling got quieter but because the misconfigurations stopped being created.
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